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Abstract. In the current architecture of the Internet, there is a strong
asymmetry in terms of power between the entities that gather and pro-
cess personal data (e.g., major Internet companies, telecom operators,
cloud providers, . . . ) and the individuals from which this personal data is
issued. In particular, individuals have no choice but to blindly trust that
these entities will respect their privacy and protect their personal data.
In this position paper, we address this issue by proposing an utopian
crypto-democracy model based on existing scientific achievements from
the field of cryptography. More precisely, our main objective is to show
that cryptographic primitives, including in particular secure multiparty
computation, offer a practical solution to protect privacy while minimiz-
ing the trust assumptions. In the crypto-democracy envisioned, individ-
uals do not have to trust a single physical entity with their personal data
but rather their data is distributed among several institutions. Together
these institutions form a virtual entity called the Trustworthy that is
responsible for the storage of this data but which can also compute on it
(provided first that all the institutions agree on this). Finally, we also pro-
pose a realistic proof-of-concept of the Trustworthy, in which the roles of
institutions are played by universities. This proof-of-concept would have
an important impact in demonstrating the possibilities offered by the
crypto-democracy paradigm.
Keywords: Privacy, Trust, Secure Computation, Democracy.
1 Introduction
The recent revelations from Snowden about the NSA’s ability to eavesdrop on
communications, as well as to track the digital traces left by Internet users,
clearly demonstrates that we are currently moving towards an information age
that is not so far from 1984. Since the original novel from Orwell, the concept of
Big Brother has become a powerful meme. Indeed even if few people understand
the subtleties of modern cryptography, the potential abuses resulting from the
massive collection of personal data and the associated invasion of privacy is very
present in people’s mind. Thus, Big Brother is now synonymous of a dystopian
future in literature, movies, arts and general culture.
The amount of information collected by Internet companies and third par-
ties on individuals increases every day, both in quantity and in diversity. For
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instance, some actors have access to personal data such as social relationships,
email content, income information, medical records, credit card and fidelity card
usage, pictures taken through public and private cameras, personal files, navi-
gation behavior, location, biometrics, data issued from quantified self, . . . , just
to name a few. In addition, the ability to capture and record all aspects of life
(both real and virtual) of users has increased dramatically recently due to new
technological developments. For instance, Memoto1 was originally a Kickstarter
project whose objective was the development of a small camera worn by the
user that would automatically generate a picture of its surroundings that would
be associated with GPS position and the corresponding timestamp. Even more
recently, the concept of Google glass has appeared to be very attractive to some
users. However, its adoption will also certainly exacerbate the privacy concern
of others.
On one hand, this massive collection of information raises many privacy is-
sues since most data is personal and thus sensitive by nature. Already today, the
accumulated amount of data collected is very significant but the possible abuses
are still limited because its potential cannot be fully exploited, both for legal and
technical reasons. For instance, the possibility of cross-referencing databases is
often limited due to privacy laws regulating the gathering and processing of per-
sonal data. In addition, it is expected that the inference capabilities will increase
dramatically as more and more data become available and gets concentrated in
the hands of a few actors. Thus, we can reasonably believe that we do not have
yet a full-fledged Big Brother because all this information is not accessible easily
by one entity (except maybe the NSA).
On the other hand, the information captured could also be used in a number
of useful and innovative manners. For instance, currently in Russia many cars
are equipped with cameras in order to prevent corrupt policemen from charg-
ing a driver with a fictitious crime or to simplify insurance settlements. Thus,
the record of this information can act as a safeguard against corruption. Com-
ing from the quantified self movement, it has been suggested to rely on devices
that regularly study your body while you shower to detect diseases and impor-
tant changes such as pregnancy. Aggregate information also allows to pinpoint
infections and cancers as well as their sources, such as poisoned wells.
With the advent of Big Data, machines will be able to perform fine-grained
inferences that are not yet possible. While the basic statistical (actuarial) model
is already at least as good (and often better) than experts at making predictions
[BT02], machine learning has the potential for extracting even more useful infor-
mation from large amount of data. This information can be used for good (e.g.,
finding a link between some profiles and particular sicknesses) or for bad (e.g.,
denying to someone the access to an health insurance because he is classified
as a high risk profile). Ultimately, the machine might even become better at
predicting the behavior of an individual than the person himself. For instance,
a teenager has recently experienced the strange situation in which her father
learned that she was pregnant due to a targeted advertisement that she received
1 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/martinkallstrom/memoto-lifelogging-camera
The Crypto-democracy and the Trustworthy 3
in her mailbox based on the profile constructed by the supermarket company
out of her purchasing list2.
One possibility for protecting privacy could be to work on anonymous or
pseudonymous data. Unfortunately, anonymizing data in a sound and robust
manner is a very difficult and sometimes even impossible task [Ohm10]. For in-
stance, simply removing the personally identifiable information from the released
data is usually insufficient to protect the privacy of a user. Indeed, it is possible
that the combination of some attributes, which individually are innocuous, could
act as a quasi-identifier and thus be used to de-anonymize the data. Thus, there
is always the risk that an anonymous profile can be re-identified and linked to a
real identity. In addition, if the data is composed of the queries or the mobility
traces of a user, then this data is so rich that it can be used to build a very de-
tailed profile of a user containing a lot of personal information. Even more, this
profile (whether it is or not anonymous) can have a tangible impact of the life
of the user. For instance, this profile might impact the price paid for a product
or in an extreme case a service could be denied because of this profile, which is
a form of discrimination.
Another possibility for an individual to protect his privacy would be to seg-
regate himself from technology by not sharing information in any way. However,
we believe that such an approach is both a step backward and impossible in
practice as the digital traces of the actions of the user are collected often by
systems that he is unaware of or he has limited or no control on. For instance,
in most cities the users of a public transportation system constantly leave traces
of their whereabouts through their transport pass. Thus, the main challenge is
to be able to exploit the vast possibilities offered by the use of personal data in
a secure and private manner.
In this position paper, we state our position regarding the utopian application
of secure multiparty computation to democracy and propose a practical project
on this theme. The outline of the paper is the following. First in Section 2, we
discuss how trust is a central notion to any solution that stores and processes
personal data. In particular, we highlight the trust assumptions that are usu-
ally made (implicitly or explicitly) by the current existing architectures. Then
in Section 3, we introduce, what we coin as the “crypto-democracy utopia”, in
which cryptographic techniques are use to distributively implement a (virtual)
trustworthy party that we coin as the Trustworthy. The role of the Trustworthy
is to manage the processing and storing of personal data in a secure and pri-
vate manner while minimizing the trust assumptions. Afterwords in Section 4,
we review the state-of-the-art of cryptographic techniques such as secure multi-
party computation and secret sharing that constitute the building blocks of our
proposition for the Trustworthy before describing in Section 5 a proposition for
a proof-of-concept downscale version of the Trustworhty. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hp&
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2 Architecture of Trust
Trust is an essential and unavoidable concept strongly linked to security and
privacy. However, it is also a notion that cannot be easily and universally defined.
In this section, we discuss the notion of trust and we make explicit the trust
assumptions done by existing architectures. This will enable us later to put
in perspective the trust assumptions that we are making ourselves with our
approach in the following sections.
Making trust explicit. In cryptography, trust is one of the fundamental
element. At the same time it is often left aside and not defined explicitly. For
instance, most of the fundamental results in cryptography assume that the main
participants, Alice and Bob, are themselves cryptographers, that they each have
access to a computer that is fully secure and under their control and that the
software they execute on this computer is well known and understood by them. In
addition, when involved in the protocol other assumptions that are sometimes
made is that Alice and Bob perform no other task when participating to the
protocol and that they do not run several sessions of the protocol in parallel.
The adversary model has also to define precisely the capacities of the attacker,
both in terms of the attacks that it can performed and the ressources he can
used (e.g., memory, computational power, eavesdropping capability, . . . ) Thus,
in practice in order for the protocol to be really secure, several trust assumptions
have to be made.
In a different context, when using a smartphone a user has to trust that
the hardware (e.g., the SIM card) and software installed on his device are secure
and will not leak private information about him without his consent. In addition,
when the user downloads an application on the App Store, the user trusts that
Apple has verified the behavior and the code of the application and that there
is no risk in using it. In practice, these trust assumptions can be betrayed if
the smartphone is infected by malware or if information leaks out of the device
through a malicious application. On the Internet, when the user gives his data
to a company or a cloud provider, in some sense he is doing an act of faith that
this entity will respect his privacy. Similarly, when navigating on the web, for the
user to believe that a website will forget the digital traces left by his interactions
if it follows the Do Not Track Initiative is also a kind of wishful thinking.
Trust is also a central ingredient of public-key infrastructures in which cer-
tification authorities are responsible for certifying the identity of an entity or in
its decentralized version of the Web of Trust (i.e., through PGP-like solutions).
Finally, even in quantum cryptography in which the security of the protocol is
supposed to depend on the physical laws of quantum mechanics, ultimately one
has to trust the hardware provided by the quantum cryptography company.
More crypto does not mean more trust. Adding more cryptography to
a particular service does not necessarily make it more trustworthy. For instance,
a few years ago the debit card in Canada were equipped with a secure chip and
a PIN in contrast with the credit cards themselves (at that time). Thus, one
can say that the debit card was more trustworthy as it relies on more advanced
cryptography and clearly provide more security, but was is really the case? In
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reality, several persons were facing serious issues after being stolen their PIN.
Indeed, the reaction of the bank was that the system in place is secure and that
the users are guilty of not having protected their PIN. Those unlucky customers
were having the burden of proof, mainly because the security of the system was
unquestioned. In contrast, the lack of security of the credit card was such that
the bank would have almost no capacity to contradict a person claiming not to
have made a purchase. Of course, the total cost of the fraud for credit cards was
huge and the lack of security was clearly very costly for the credit card company,
and thus indirectly for their clients. Still this example illustrates that stronger
cryptography does not automatically improve trust. Another common example is
the situation in which a user is forced due to the password policy to choose a very
complex password and to change it very frequently. In this situation, it is often
the case that the user will end up writing his very secret password on a post-it
next to his screen or that he will never log out. This situation also exemplifies
that adding more security features can sometimes lead to less security if it is not
balanced with usability. In addition, the user also has to trust that the current
implementation of cryptographic primitives is indeed doing what it is supposed
to do.
One should not have to trust the goodwill of others. Another aspect
of trust concerns the potential corruption of insiders. In particular, it is very
dangerous to base security on trusting trust users as illustrated by the following
anecdote. In this anecdote, one of the author was asked by one of his colleague
why he is using a Gmail account instead of the email system provided by his
department. In particular, his colleague insisted that he should not share all this
private data, personal email and other sensitive information with companies
such as Google. This means that the colleague was putting more trust on the
technical support of the department than on Google itself. The response of the
author to this criticism is very simple. On one hand, it is true that most of the
staff from technical support in charge of the email accounts are very nice persons
that it know the members of the department for a long time. Thus, it can be
assumed that they do not to spy on the members of the department. On the
other hand, one can easily imagine a scenario in which a conflict might arise
between a person from the technical support and a professor, in which case the
access to the email account might become problematic. In contrast, while Google
also has incentives to spy on email (e.g., for personalized services and targeted
advertising), it has no interest in leaking this data while an angry member of
the technical support might be tempted to do so. One typical trust assumption
is that rational players have to be honest, which unfortunately does not protect
against a fully malicious player.
To summarize, while cryptography is a prerequisite to build security, in all
known systems there is also a question of trust. For instance, the user might
have to trust software, laws, computers, networks, companies, humans or gov-
ernments. Thus, the fundamental question is always: who are you ready to trust
and to which extent. In particular, while trust assumptions always have to be
made, one should aim for a solution in which these trust assumptions are min-
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imal, realistic and consistent. In particular, we believe that the security and
privacy guarantees provided by an architecture should not depend on the trust
that one puts on a single entity. In the following sections, we will discuss how
cryptography can reduce the semantic gap between the security provided in the-
ory, the one achieved in practice and the one perceived by the end user.
3 The Crypto-democracy Utopia
We believe that society is in need of an elegant solution to answer to the ever
growing privacy concerns. This solution should provide strong privacy guaran-
tees while still bringing the benefits of the knowledge that can be extracted
from the collected data. While we recognize that the suggestion of an entity,
collecting and managing all private and public information, evokes right away
the dystopian Big Brother, in this section we will describe an utopian alterna-
tive based on sound science. In particular, we believe that techniques originating
from secure multiparty computation can reconcile the antagonist needs of pri-
vacy and the ability to exploit personal data for the benefit of individuals and
the greater good. While this utopian dream is already possible in theory with
existing cryptographic techniques, realizing it in practice requires a significant
increase in computation power and communication efficiency as well as algorith-
mic advances, not to mention a deep social revolution. However, both technology
and cryptography are improving at a fast pace. For instance during the last 50
years, the processing capacity of computers has been multiplied by a factor close
to a 1000 times per decade. Thus, what seems to be out of reach of current tech-
nology might become possible a near future. In addition, new breakthroughs in
cryptography have been invented on a regularly basis. For instance, the concept
of fully homomorphic encryption was only materialized in 2009 [Gen09] but its
efficiency has been improved rapidly under thorough efforts of the cryptography
community.
The Trustworthy. In this section, we propose a cryptographic approach to
democracy, which is respectful of the privacy of citizens due to the way personal
data is managed. In a nutshell, a set of carefully chosen independent institutions
will implement a virtual entity, called the Trustworthy, in a distributed and se-
cure manner using known cryptographic techniques. The Trustworthy would be
responsible for managing the public and private information related to individ-
uals. None of the institutions would have directly access to the private data.
Instead a precise access structure would specify the level of collaboration nec-
essary between these different institutions before it is possible to extract or use
data from the Trustworthy. For instance, one possible access structure could be
that a majority of the institutions have to be involved before the private infor-
mation considered can be retrieved from the system, while another one could
be that unanimity is required if the piece of data considered is really sensitive.
In addition, to having the capacity to retrieve the data, the institutions would
be able to compute over it (provided that the predefined number of institutions
accept to collaborate), thus creating new knowledge. Note that the users are not
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involved in this computation as once a user has trusted the Trustworthy with his
data, the Trustworthy can perform operations on it without further interaction
with the user. Another objective of those institutions is to guarantee the cor-
rectness and appropriate behavior of the equipment, software and infrastructure
under their control. This is especially important for the access points in which
new fresh data can be entered in the trusted third, both to avoid the possibility
of introducing fake data in the system and also to ensure that the data of a user
does not leak at this entrance point.
Choice of institution and access structure. The choice of institutions
that will be part of the distributed implementation of the Trustworthy is a
central aspect of the system and many scenarios are possible. However, in all
cases, the choice of the institutions should be done in a way reaching a quasi-
consensus in society. In practice, this does not mean that each citizen would have
to trust all the institutions. On the contrary, if unanimity is required before
data can be accessed then it is enough if each individual trusts that at least
one of the elected institutions behaves in way that protect his privacy and civil
rights. In addition, the structure chosen to reach this utopian goal is likely to be
different from the ones that are currently used in most democratic countries. In
particular, we believe that in order to avoid the transformation of the trusted
third into Big Brother, each institution should not be under the control of the
same entity (e.g., the government). Instead these institutions should represent
in a balanced way different categories of the population and groups of interests.
Examples of institutions could be a political party, a college of professionals, a
religious group, the supreme court, a data protection authority or a non-profit
organization, just to cite a few. Of course, the set of institutions does not need to
be fixed for eternity and new institutions with a clear mandate could be elected
to participate to the realization of the crypto-democracy.
For a given set of institutions, there are many possible designs for the access
structure. In a nutshell, an access structure is a set of rules specifying the type
of collaboration and consensus required from institutions to retrieve or compute
on data. An access structure stating that the collaboration of at least k amongst
n institutions is needed is both generic and powerful as it encapsulates access
policies such as majority, unanimity and quorum. Of course, not all type of data
should require the same threshold but we believe that the previously stated ones
cover most useful situations. In addition even if not all data should be treated
equally, having too many different access structures could render the system
unnecessarily complex.
Consistent, simple and self-explanatory trust model. In the crypto-
democracy paradigm, there is a strong correlation between the trust assumptions
that are made in theory and how they should really be in practice. In partic-
ular, all institutions would certify that the entrance point in which data is fed
into the system, including its hardware and software, is compliant with what is
publicly expected to guarantee that there is no undue monitoring of the data.
Furthermore, when the unanimity access structure is applied, it is clear from the
user point of view that he only has to trust a single institution in being honest
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in order to trust the system, which is exactly in concordance with the theory.
Another important aspect of trust is how robust is the system under the corrup-
tion of some institutions. Indeed, having a friend that works in an institution
and is willing to provide private data is one thing, but having a corrupted friend
in each institution is a conspiracy.
Hardware, software and infrastructure requirements. In practice,
each institution would need to own a super computer or a dedicated cluster
and to have a team of cryptographers and security experts. In addition, each
institution should scrutinize and monitor very carefully all the materials and
the employees working under their supervision, with a special care to the en-
trance point for fresh data. While such requirements have a non-negligible cost,
we believe that trust, privacy and security are sufficiently important concepts
to deserve such an investment. For instance in Montreal, there is currently the
project to build a new bridge that will cost around 5 billions US dollars. While
the project is fundamental for the city, this bridge is only one among others con-
necting the island of Montreal to the rest of Quebec. In comparison, the large
data center that Google constructs in Singapore costs 120 millions US dollars
and thus 5 billions would pay for 40 of them.
4 State-of-the-art in Secure Computation
In this section, we give a brief overview of the existing modern cryptographic
techniques that could be used to implement the crypto-democracy. In theory
at least, those techniques provide all the necessary ingredients to concretize the
different aspects discussed in the previous sections. However to realize them in
practice, the following issues have to be tackled: cost, speed, and scalability. After
reviewing the state-of-the-art of the cryptographic primitives in this section and
discussing the current existing implementations of such technologies, we describe
in the next section a proposal for a downscale version of the Trustworthy that
can be realistically implemented at a very reasonable cost.
4.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
Informally, secure multiparty computation [Gol09,CD14,CDN14] (which we sim-
ply call secure computation for the rest of this paper) is the field of cryptography
studying how to securely and privately implement a distributed function that
depends on the private inputs of many participants. Another way to phrase
it is to say that the objective of secure computation is to emulate a trusted
third party (e.g., the Trustworthy) through a distributed protocol between par-
ticipants without actually requiring that every participant trust everyone else.
Security is generally defined with respect to a particular adversary model, which
captures the actions that can be performed by dishonest participants. For in-
stance, some participants might be honest-but curious, meaning that they follow
the recipe of the protocol but collude together by exchanging their knowledge
and information about the messages they have seen in order to break the privacy
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of the input of honest participants. In a stronger adversary model, participants
can be fully malicious and cheat arbitrarily. In this setting, in addition of break-
ing the privacy of the input of honest participants, the objective of the adversary
can be to attack the correctness of the protocol (i.e., by influencing its output)
or its robustness (i.e., by making it abort). Thereafter, we will use the term
“trust model” to encompass at the same time the adversary model considered
as well as the trust assumptions that are made (both implicit and explicit).
More formally, we can define the general task of secure computation in the
following manner.
Definition 1 (Secure computation). With respect to a particular trust model
T , a protocol securely computes a function f , if for any input X = (x1, ..., xn)
provided by n participants, as long as the trust assumptions of T are not betrayed,
all participant only learn f(X) and no additional information leaks from the
protocol.
This definition does not prevent the function itself from revealing sensitive
information regarding the private input of specific participant (this issue is mag-
nified if several functions are computed on this private data).This problem has
been thoroughly studied in the literature and approaches such as the notion of
differential privacy have been proposed to mitigate this issue [DMNS06,Dwo08].
4.2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing [Sha79] is a cryptographic technique that can be used to distribute
a secret between several participants in such a way that only a legitimate group
of participants can reconstruct the secret. For instance, in a k-out-of-n secret
sharing scheme, any set of k or more participants out of n can reconstruct the
secret but less then k participants have absolutely no information on the secret.
In this way, the code of a bank safe could be split in such way that it can be
reconstructed only if two out of three vice presidents join their personal shares
(i.e., piece of the information). Most of the existing secret sharing schemes are
information-theoretically secure, which means that an unauthorized group does
not have in his hands the information to reconstruct the secret regardless of his
computational power.
In this paper, we use secret sharing as a tool enabling users to distribute
their secret across several institutions. In addition, secret sharing often forms
the basis of secure computation protocols. More precisely, several protocols relies
on an extension of secret sharing known as verifiable secret sharing. In standard
secret sharing, if the shares are corrupted then the secret is lost and cannot
be reconstructed. In contrast, Verifiable Secret sharing [CGMA85] allows the
reconstruction of the secret as long as a restricted amount of shares remain
uncorrupted. Thus, verifiable secret sharing ensures the validity of the data.
4.3 Secure Computation with an Honest Majority
The two fundamental results of secure computation have appeared the end of
the eighties [GMW87,CCD88]. In a nutshell, these results consist in generic con-
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structions showing that under the assumption that strictly more than two thirds
of the participants are honest then any function can be computed securely. Thus,
as long as strictly less than one third of the participants are malicious, regard-
less of their technological and computational power, they will not be able to
learn information about the inputs of honest participants or force the protocol
to output an incorrect result. Thereafter, we denote by n the total number of
participants involved in the secure computation and t the number of malicious
(i.e., corrupted) participants. Most of these early protocols for secure computa-
tion relies on multiplication and addition over a large field rather than on bits
and NAND gates but they can be applied to compute any generic boolean cir-
cuit. In particular, these protocols are not efficient because each multiplication
(i.e., AND gate) require interactions between all participants.
Although the original techniques for secure computation are now approxi-
mately 25 years old, the field is still very active. The generic construction for
secure computation requiring a strict majority of honest participants was orig-
inally presented in [RBO89] but that construction require a secure broadcast
channel. Since then, more efficient solutions have been designed. The construc-
tion of [BTH08] only requires linear communication complexity in the number of
players for each multiplication gate but can only tolerate t < n/3 corrupt players.
The construction of [BSFO12] requires approximately O(n log n) communication
bits per multiplication gate and can tolerate any minority of malicious partici-
pants. With respect to the asynchronous setting, the construction proposed in
[CHP13] is secure as long as t < n/3, and has a communication complexity
proportional to the number of players multiplied by the number of multiplica-
tion gates of the circuit representing the function to be computed. The work of
[CDI+13] can tolerate up to n(1/2 − ǫ) for any ǫ > 0 (a smaller value epsilon
increases the size of the constant) of malicious players and achieves a linear com-
munication complexity in the number of players per multiplication gate. Finally,
other theoretically interesting protocols include [DIK+08,DIK10].
4.4 Secure Computation without Honest Majority
In some situations, the assumption that two thirds or a majority of the par-
ticipants are honest may be too strong. For instance, a government might be
unwilling to share information if there is a risk that the other parties might leak
some information (thus breaching the privacy property). It might be also the
case that the information is so sensitive and trust so limited that participants
only trust that a particular party will protect their data. In particular, this
means that even if up to n − 1 participants are corrupted, the protocol is still
secure. For this setting, it was shown in [Cle86] that certain distributed tasks are
impossible without an honest majority. Thus it is impossible to achieve secure
computation in full generality in this context without making either computa-
tional assumptions or physical assumptions such as the availability of trusted
hardware.
A powerful and elegant solution is to base the construction of secure computa-
tion on a cryptographic primitive called oblivious transfer [Rab81,EGL85,Cre´88].
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In this asymmetric bipartite primitive, the sender sends two messages in the
oblivious transfer and the receiver gets to choose one of these values. In ad-
dition, the sender is oblivious to the choice of the receiver (i.e., he gets no
information about this choice) and the receiver does not learn any information
on the message he did not choose to learn. This primitive can be implemented
using computational assumptions and is universal in the sense that the secure
computation of any function can be implemented even if almost all participants
are corrupted.
The protocol proposed in [NNOB12] is based on [CvdGT95] and provides
secure computation solely from oblivious transfer. Both protocols first shares
the inputs between two participants. Once this sharing has occurred the parties
can perform operations such as AND, OR and XOR on distributed bits by relying
on oblivious transfer. The latest construction only requires a constant number
of bits of communication per gate. When extended to multiple participants, the
complexity grows linearly in the number of players and the size of the circuit
to be evaluated. Another construction of interest for secure computation is the
IPS compiler named after its authors [IPS08] (an optimization was presented in
[LOP11]). In these constructions, the participants imagine virtual players taking
part in a protocol with honest majority evaluating the function in question. The
participants will not just simulate these players but each player will verify by
relying on oblivious transfer that a small minority of theses imagined players
are acting honestly. As such, since making the protocol with honest majority fail
would require that a participant corrupt a majority of virtual players, the honest
participant will detect any effective cheating except with negligible probability.
The communication complexity of [LOP11] is proportional to the size of circuits
multiplied by the number of players.
Finally, more recent protocols [DPSZ12,DKL+13,KSS13,KS13,WNL+14] al-
low the evaluation of circuits with a complexity that is linear in the size of
the circuit and the number of players, with the aid of pre-processing using some-
what homomorphic encryption. These protocols rely on the idea of multiplicative
triples in the information-theoretic setting.
4.5 Applications
In principle, the range of applications of secure computation is extremely large
but relatively few implementations exist. The first public implementation was
realized by Ivan Damg˚ard and his team [BCD+09]. This implementation was
used in the context of an auction for the production rights of sugar beets. More
precisely in Denmark, farmers can buy and sell production rights and the se-
cure computation was used to find the market equilibrium price and the amount
bought and sold for that price. The implementation consists of an honest ma-
jority protocol with three institutions. The event involved roughly 1200 farmers
and took roughly half an hour. Since, the protocol is repeated annually.
Secure computation can also used to perform general statistical data anal-
ysis. For instance, it was shown in [WH12], that by using fully homomorphic
encryption, private linear regression on 4194304 elements can be completed in
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256 minutes. Similarly, secure computation has also found applications in finan-
cial data analysis. In [BTW12], a solution was developed to analyze financial
data in a private fashion for the ITL (Estonian Association of Information Tech-
nology and Telecommunications). This protocol is run roughly every six months.
Another existing application of secure computation that was recently proposed
is the detection of satellite collisions [KW13].
Secure computation can also protect the privacy of genetic and medical
data [KBLV13,EN13]. In terms of performance in [KBLV13], the authors have
compared the secure version of an algorithm against the standard algorithms
and showed that the private algorithm was roughly 720 times slower. How-
ever, it is expected that further advances in secure computation will signif-
icantly reduce this factor. In addition, for some computations for which the
privacy aspect is of paramount importance, this factor may not be so detri-
mental. Open source implementations of secure computation can be found in
[MNPS04,BDNP08,EFLL12]
5 Proposal for a Scaled Down Trustworthy
In order to demonstrate the practicality of the crypto-democracy, we propose in
this section a preliminary implementation for a minimalistic Trustworthy. More
precisely, we would like to use this significantly scaled down version of the Trust-
worthy as a proof-of concept to study the usefulness and feasibility of this type
of initiative. In addition, another important contribution of such a project is to
raise the awareness and interest of the security and privacy communities as well
as the public at large. This implementation of the Trustworthy would use 5 inde-
pendent universities as institutions. The main objectives of this implementation
is to store in a secure and private manner the sensitive data belonging to users
and to be able to conduct privacy-preserving data analysis for research in fields
such as medicine and humanities. In particular, the Trustworthy can be used
to provide meaningful non-trivial statistics on the data collected while ensuring
that no single entity will be able to access this data in clear.
In this position paper, we only outline the main features of this implementa-
tion. However following the publication of paper, if we observe that the interest
generated is sufficient, then we are planning to publish a technical report pro-
viding more details about the implementation.
5.1 Choice of Institutions
Relying on universities to play the role of institutions when implementing the
Trustworthy seems to be a natural choice. Indeed, universities appear as a rele-
vant choice because they are relatively independent and are trustworthy to the
eye of the public. They also generally have the resources as well as expertise (in
particular if they have a good security or cryptography research team) to guar-
antee the security and trust with respect to the software, hardware and network
required by such an endeavor. Furthermore, we believe that it should not be
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difficult to find 5 universities spread around the world that would be sufficiently
motivated to participate to this project.
Once the institutions have been selected, it will be essential to define a clear
governance structure. For instance, no single university should be the sole mas-
ter of the Trustworthy. Rather, we propose that the direction, decisions and
computations that the trusted third will take should be decided by a simple
majority structure in which each institution has exactly one vote. In addition,
for specific data that have a higher degree of sensibility a stronger constraint
such as unanimity across the institutions can be implemented. In this situation,
no computation will be performed on the data unless all the institutions agree
on this. In particular the Trustworthy cannot reveal information locked with an
unanimity threshold with a majority vote but a majority vote would be enough
to restrict the access to the data of a user or to discard it.
5.2 Functionalities Provided by the Trustworthy
In this section, we discuss in more details the data that will be secure by the
Trustworthy and the functionalities that it will provide to users. For this first
implementation, we believe that we should limit the functionalities offered to
a few that will demonstrate the potential of the approach but can already be
realized today with the current state of technology. However at the end of this
section, we suggest other functionalities that are somewhat more advanced and
could be added later.
– Secure note. Basically, this functionality simply corresponds to the possibility
for the user to store, access and modify a text file in an online manner in
the Trustworthy. This text file could be use to keep safe information such as
password, passport number or credit card details. Typically, this file could
be search by the user like a standard document and should not be too large.
– Encrypted files. The Trustworthy could be used to encrypt files chosen by the
user and be responsible for protecting the secrecy of the key. For instance,
the encrypted file could be stored on the hard drive of the user or on a cloud
provider like Dropbox, Google drive or Microsoft drive. However, the key
would be given to the Trustworthy, who would be responsible for decrypting
the files if requested by the user.
– Private email. Offering the functionality of a private email service is a natural
service that could be implemented through the Trustworthy. This functional-
ity would enable persons to exchange information in a truly private manner
and by requesting that the email contains only text, this would not require
a huge amount of storage.
– Private survey. This last functionality is the most complex but also the
most interesting feature of our proposal. Basically, the Trustworthy would be
responsible for conducting surveys, for instance in the context of a research
project in medicine or humanities. The respondent of a survey would login
and fill it privately. Afterward, the data of his particular survey will never
be reconstructed and seen by anyone in clear but rather statistics could be
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computed on the aggregate data of the different respondents to the survey
and then made public. To ensure that the information of a particular user is
sufficiently hidden into the global data, a condition on the minimal number
of responses could be predefined before any analysis can be conducted on the
data. In addition, ideally the list of statistics that will be computed should
be known by all beforehand and the output should be sanitized to ensure
privacy.
All the data stored on the Trustworthy should be secure according to some
threshold, which might vary depending on the sensitivity of the data or the
privacy expectations of users. For instance, in the case of the secure note, private
email and encrypted files the user could decide by himself which threshold he
want to use while for the survey this threshold should be fixed in advance and
publicly known before the experiment starts (i.e., before respondents begin to
answer to the survey). In order to reconstruct the private data or to compute on
it, at least the number of institutions required by the threshold have to cooperate
together.
In practice, we envision that users will access to the Trustworthy in a trans-
parent manner through their browser. Each user should have a unique identity
and connect through a university of his choice using the corresponding software.
This software should be open-source so that it can be inspected by anyone as
well as being guaranteed and checked by the institutions. First when connecting,
a mutual authentication protocol is run in which the user securely authenticates
to the trusted third and vice-versa.
5.3 Implementing the Trustworthy
For the functionalities that only need to perform secret sharing then the Shamir
scheme will be used. All symmetric encryption should be made using a standard
encryption scheme with long keys (e.g., AES with a 256 bits key). The keys
used should be created uniformly at random in order to ensure a strong level of
security.
– Communication structure. All the communications done between the user
and the institutions are secured through the use of a public-key cryptosystem
with a large key (possibly in conjunction with a protocol such as TLS) while
the communications exchanged between the institutions are secure through
the use of symmetric encryption. We also assume that the computer of the
user is secure enough such that malware cannot intercept the information
entered by the user in his web browser when connecting to the Trustworthy.
– Identification and authentication. All the interactions between the Trustwor-
thy and a user will be done through his browser. Several standard authenti-
cation techniques such as the use of a passphrase or two-way authentication
based on certificates could be used but of course their applicability and se-
curity have to be evaluated in more details with respect to the architecture
developed in the project. While the security provided by the authentication
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mechanism used is of paramount importance for ensuring the privacy and
integrity of the users’ data entrusted to the Trustworthy, a full discussion of
the different alternatives for authentication as well as their pros and cons is
out of the scope of this paper. Note however that if the adversary is able to
impersonate a specific user during authentication, this only jeopardize the
privacy of the data of this user but not of the data of all users.
– Secure note. The corresponding text file should be compressed, encrypted
and then saved on the hard drive of each institution. The key will be stored
in the Trustworthy using a secret sharing scheme with a threshold defined by
the user. The user can view and modify his file online and securely through
a web application running on his browser.
– Encrypted files. Similarly to the previous functionality, the Trustworthy
would only be responsible to store the key needed to decrypt the encrypted
files. The user can choose whether he want to store these files on a disk under
his control or on a server of his choice. The Trustworthy offers the possibility
to perform an online encryption and decryption of these files.
– Private email. This functionality could be implemented by having the email
sent a particular user stored in the Trustworthy using a secret sharing scheme
such as that no institution would have a direct access to the content of these
emails. In addition each email could itself be encrypted with the public
key of the recipient. Only this recipient would be allowed to retrieve the
corresponding shares once he has authenticated to the Trustworthy. As one
of the assumptions is that the different institutions forming the Trustworthy
are spread all around the world, the privacy of the emails would be ensured
even if one of these institutions is requested to hand over the information it
has (e.g., similarly to what happen to Lavabit and Silent Circle).
– Private survey. The private survey functionality can be implemented by com-
bining the techniques described in [BTH08] and [BCD+09]. The survey can
be represented in binary format as well as an integer to speed-up calculations.
In a nutshell, the integer would be stored using a redundant representation
(base 2, integer and base 1 for small integer) to simplify the computations.
Data consistency between the binary and the integer representation will be
verified by the Trustworthy. Examples of possible operations on the survey
data include AND and NOT (for the binary representation), the sum and
multiplication (for integer representation) and the transfer from binary to
integer (or vice-versa). It is also straightforward to compute if an encrypted
value is smaller or larger than a particular threshold. The implementation
that we propose is powerful enough to compute interesting non-trivial statis-
tics. For instance, we could easily compute the percentage of female partic-
ipants whose age is between 32 and 40 years with both diabetes and the
Coeliac disease. More precisely, this statistic requires the computation of 2
inequalities and 3 multiplications for each user in the survey. However, as
the scalability increases with the number of users, this computation could
be performed with only a constant number of messages sent.
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The cost per institution will be quite low as most of the infrastructure is
already provided by the university. With respect to the additional hardware
needed, we believe that a 3000$ server under the responsibility of each institution
should be sufficient to start the project. In particular, since the Trustworthy
is mainly responsible of the storing of the encryption keys (at least for the
secure notes and the encrypted files functionalities), the memory requirements
are relatively small. By far, the main investment for the practical realization of
this project will be the creation of the appropriate software although indirect
but limited costs have also to be taken into account (e.g., for the maintenance
and possible upgrades). We believe that a two-year period for conducting this
project is realistic.
Other internal functionalities need to be added to the Trustworthy. For in-
stance, it should be possible to reshare information with a new threshold, which
corresponds in practice to transforming the data encoded from one secret sharing
to another. In case of a hardware malfunction, it should be possible to retrieve
the corresponding data. Finally, it should also be possible to permanently remove
data from the servers (and the backup) if a user request it, thus implementing
a form of right to be forgotten. This functionality could be implemented for in-
stance by erasing the corresponding shares at the level of each institution upon
the user’s request.
6 Conclusion
Our main objective in this paper was to show that the field of secure computation
can help to the improvement of democracy. In particular, we have highlighted
how using current technologies, we could implement the Trustworthy, which is a
ideal trusted third party that could manage our personal data. The objective of
the Trustworthy is to ensure a high degree of actual and perceived privacy while
simplifying our lives. In order to show the feasibility of the approach, we have
also propose a realistic project, achievable with limited financial resources that
is interesting and powerful enough to generate interest and to enable researchers
to experiment on this concept.
In the future, we would like to investigate also additional functionalities that
could be added to the project once the basic functionalities described previously
have been implemented. For instance, we hope that the system will be powerful
and fast enough to perform more complex functions on the private survey data
such as advanced data mining or machine learning algorithms.
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